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Italia, Francia e Unione Europea ai tempi del coronavirus:
scelte politiche e ruolo dell'Europa

*La France, l'Italie et l'Union européenne au temps du coronavirus :
choix politiques et rôle de l'Europe*

SERGIO FABBRINI

PRESENTAZIONE / PRÉSENTATION

DIALOGHI
ITALO-FRANCESI
PER L'EUROPA



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The European Union and the Coronavirus

Sergio Fabbrini
Dean, Luiss Political Science Department
Professor, Politics and International Relations
Intesa Sanpaolo Chair on European Governance
Pierre Keller Visiting Professorship
Harvard University, Kennedy School of Government

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- 1. The pandemic as a symmetric crisis**
- 2. The EU decision-making structure**
- 3. The too late's/too little's syndrome**
- 4. The first battery of policy's responses**
- 5. Weakness of the policy's responses**
- 6. How to rebuild a level playing field?**



1. The pandemic as a symmetric crisis

- The EU has passed through a decade (2010s) of asymmetric crises: euro, migration, security
- Covid-19 constitutes a symmetric crisis with asymmetric effects
- It means that all member states are affected, none of them is responsible for the crisis but the national implications are different
- A symmetric crisis magnifies the need to have a common response (i.e., like to answer a military aggression)

2. The EU decision-making structure

- The EU has a highly differentiated decision-making structure: supranational (if not federal) in single market regulatory policies but intergovernmental (confederal) in core state power policies
- Public health policy is mainly intergovernmental (national competences, Brussels coordination, dependence on national resources)
- Its financial implications have to be managed by ECOFIN and Eurogroup (intergovernmental governance, coordination, unanimity)

3. The too late's/too little's syndrome

- Intergovernmental governance's unanimity precludes swift response to a crisis (as it happened during the euro crisis of the first half of 2010s)
- Intergovernmental governance brings back to the surface the concept of 'national interest'
- Crises with distributive effects, opposing the interests and visions of member states, cannot be dealt with the unanimity's logic
- The pandemic led intergovernmental governance to divide internally again (between north/south as in the financial crisis)

4. The first battery of policy's responses

- Although with unjustifiable delay, the EU/Eurozone answered the pandemic faster than to the post-2010 euro crisis
- ECB: Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP): EUR 900 billions
- Commission: suspension of the SGP; relaxation of the anti-state aid rules; SURE (EUR 100 billions); use of structural funds' residuals without co-financing; use of the EU budget (EUR 37 bilions)
- Eurogroup: ESM with limited conditionality (EUR 240 billions) and EIB (EUR 200 billions)

5. Weakness of the policy's responses

- Context: 50,000 deads, 500,000 infected, 10% drop in EZ GDP, southern economies in recession
- EUR 500 billions – highly insufficient (US response: 6 time higher)
- All the policy's responses based on loans (to be refunded), the SGP suspension is temporary, deficit spending would trigger financial markets' reaction
- The after-pandemic would see the southern member states with less resources for reviving the economy – than northern member states

6. How to rebuild a level playing field?

- The Recovery Fund is the crucial policy's instrument: grants and not loans
- To be financed through EU public debt securities guaranteed by the EU budget – respecting no debt mutualisation/no bail-out (TFEU, Art. 123-125) and balanced budget (Art.310)
- State tax armonization (TFEU Art. 114 and Art. 310) and new fiscal vehicles (web company taxes collected by the member states on behalf of the EU): from fiscal regulation to fiscal capacity – rebalancing of the Eurozone
- France, Italy and Spain vs. the northern confederal logic – and Germany?

Sergio Fabbrini
**Manuale
di autodifesa
europeista**

**Come rispondere
alla sfida sovranista**

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Prefazione di Sabino Cassese
Postfazione di Fabio Tamburini

